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I. Introduction 
 
Pastoralists in East Africa’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) regularly confront climatic shocks 
triggering massive herd die-offs and loss of scarce wealth.  On the surface, it appears puzzling 
that pastoralists do not make extensive use of livestock markets to offload animals when climatic 
shocks temporarily reduce the carrying capacity of local rangelands, and then use markets to 
restock their herds when local conditions recover.  In recent years, donors and policy makers 
have begun to hypothesize that investments in livestock marketing systems might quickly pay for 
themselves through reduced demand for relief aid,by increasing pastoralist marketing 
responsiveness to temporal variation in range conditions. 
 
Such investments include information (ex post or forecasts) on climate or prices, reduced 
transactions costs and/or increased prices through transport subsidies, the improvement of roads, 
the creation of pastoralist marketing cooperatives, revision of cultural institutions that create 
complex property rights in animals, and the opening of financial institutions that might serve as 
safe repositories for livestock sales proceeds, etc. This chapter examines whether these 
hypotheses are valid and whether they would be effective should policies based on them be 
implemented. 
 
This emphasis on livestock marketing as a means for managing risk may reflect, however,  an 
insufficient understanding of the incentives pastoralists face and their long-term incentives to 
hold livestock.  In a local economy offering negligible alternative livelihoods, livestock are the 
most attractive asset available (Desta 1999, McPeak forthcoming) and one of the best means to 
ensure future household food security.  The highly nonlinear herd dynamics characteristic of 
poverty traps (Barrett et al. 2004, Lybbert et al. 2004, Barrett and McPeak forthcoming) , 
coupled with the observation that although livestock sales today increase current cash income 
and thus consumption, sales come at the cost of decreased future income and consumption 
(McPeak 2004), pastoralists might rationally maximize herd size and limit marketed off-take to 
animals needed to raise cash to meet immediate expenditure requirements.  
 
This chapter aims to improve our understanding of the factors that affect pastoralists' marketed 
off-take response with a view to informing this ongoing policy debate.  The next section briefly 
describes the data we use in the paper.  Section III then explores particular hypotheses of interest 
regarding household livestock marketing behavior.  Section IV concludes with some of the 
policy implications of these findings. 
 
 
II. Data 
 
We use data collected from pastoralist households in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia by 
the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program (GL CRSP) Pastoralist 
Risk Management (PARIMA) project on a quarterly basis over a two-year period beginning in 
June 2000 and ending in June 2002.  In June 2002, we supplemented the usual household-level 
survey instrument – which included detailed information on marketed off-take behavior and a 
wide range of other data on herd status – with a detailed module to gather more precise 
information on recent livestock marketing transactions.  A total of 330 households were 
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randomly sampled from the 11 different sites depicted in Figure 1: six in northern Kenya (Dirib 
Gumbo, Kargi, Logologo, Ng’ambo, North Horr and Suguta Marmar and five in southern 
Ethiopia (Dida Hara, Dillo, Finchawa, Qorate and Wachille). The sites were chosen to capture 
variation in agricultural potential, market access, livestock mobility and ethnic diversity. As 
shown in Table 1, the study area encompassed approximately 124,000 km2 and spanned several 
ethnic groups, including the Ariaal, Boran, Chamus, Gabra, Gurji, Rendille, and Samburu. 
 
 
Figure 1: Survey Sites in Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya 
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Table 1: Site Descriptions 
 
Country Site Name 
Market 
Access 
Ethnic 
Majority
Agricultural 
Potential 
Annual 
Rainfall
Kenya Dirib Gombo Medium Boran High 650 
  Kargi Low Rendille Low 200 
  Logologo Medium Ariaal Medium-Low 250 
  Ng’ambo High Il Chamus High 650 
  North Horr Low Gabra Low 150 
  
Sugata 
Marmar High Samburu Medium 500 
Ethiopia Dida Hara Medium Boran Medium 500 
  Dillo Low Boran Low 400 
  Finchawa High Guji High 650 
  Qorate Low Boran Low 450 
  Wachille Medium Boran Medium 550 
  
 
III. Household Marketing Behavior: Some Hypotheses  
 
These data permit us to explore several prospective explanations for household-level livestock 
marketing behavior.  Each of these explanations carries implications for policymakers, donors 
and operational agencies concerned about the performance of livestock marketing systems and 
the welfare of pastoralist peoples in the region.  Some of the implications conflict with those 
assumed by outside observers, highlighting the critical importance of looking carefully at the 
empirical evidence before proceeding with the design and implementation of policy. 
 
A. Herd Size and Dependence on Livestock 
 
Perhaps the first important results we find are that pastoralist households are far from autarkic 
and they do adjust their livestock market participation in response to drought shocks.  Greater 
than nine out of ten pastoralist households in our sample used livestock markets at some point 
during the survey period, either to sell or buy animals.  As seen in Table 2, market participation –
defined as either purchasing or selling livestock on the market – varies over time, with fewer 
households participating in livestock trading during the June 2002 quarter1 as opposed to June 
2000, with the exception of Qorate.  In response to one of the worst droughts in years, household 
demand for livestock marketing was especially high during our initial survey period.  We find 
that most households participate in the livestock market and that they participate most actively 
when prompted by environmental stress, albeit almost entirely as sellers rather than buyers.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Note that each survey captures a three-month interval, therefore participating in the market in June 2000 reflects 
either selling or buying livestock via the market at least once between April and June 2000. 
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Table 2: Percentage of HHs Participating in the Livestock Market, by Quarter and Site 
 
 
Jun-
00 
Sep-
00 
Dec-
00 
Mar-
01 
Jun-
01 
Sep-
01 
Dec-
01 
Mar-
02 
Jun-
02   
HHs Marketing 
Livestock 
during Survey 
Period 
Dirib Gumbo 68% 42% 21% 19% 10% 26% 29% 19% 0%  97% 
Kargi 70% 37% 40% 20% 47% 60% 28% 40% 33%  97% 
Logo Logo 43% 47% 25% 37% 30% 13% 37% 7% 7%  87% 
Ng’ambo 43% 40% 41% 43% 30% 13% 6% 6% 3%  87% 
North Horr 53% 50% 54% 27% 67% 41% 45% 24% 17%  94% 
Suguta Marmar 60% 40% 30% 40% 13% 33% 23% 47% 7%  90% 
Kenya Weighted Avg 56% 43% 35% 31% 33% 31% 28% 24% 11%  92% 
             
Dida Hara 57% 37% 23% 20% 23% 27% 39% 30% 37%  90% 
Dillo 43% 33% 20% 23% 17% 17% 33% 33% 30%  87% 
Finchawa 58% 48% 73% 45% 48% 32% 45% 10% 7%  100% 
Qorate 13% 23% 0% 20% 20% 0% 23% 3% 33%  63% 
Wachille 30% 37% 20% 43% 20% 20% 32% 33% 23%  93% 
Ethiopia Weighted Avg 40% 36% 27% 30% 26% 19% 34% 22% 26%   87% 
 
Kargi, Dirib Gumbo and North Horr have the highest rates of market participation amongst the 
six Kenyan sites, while Ng’ambo, Logologo and Suguta Marmar have the lowest rates of market 
participation. This likely reflects several key facts.  First, the low market participation sites have 
the best access to alternative livelihoods.  Logologo lies along the main Marsabit-Nairobi road 
and has the largest proportion of household participants in the wage/salary workforce amongst 
the 11 survey sites.  Ng’ambo is near the town of Marigat in Baringo District and abuts the 
Perkerra irrigation scheme, which allows for sedentarized cultivation – especially maize and 
papaya – on a scale and with expected returns unavailable elsewhere in our study area. In their 
analysis of livestock income and non-livestock income, McPeak and Little (forthcoming) show 
that non-livestock income sources provide the majority of income for these three sites (Figure 2).  
These sites not only exhibit higher income than the sites where households depend more on 
livestock for income generation, households there also enjoy better access to markets and 
infrastructure and earn more diversified incomes.  These also tend to be more sedentarized, 
although there are important exceptions to this tendency.  As a result, herd sizes in Logologo, 
Ng’ambo and Suguta Marmar are somewhat smaller and livestock market participation rates are 
likewise lower (Table 3). 
 
The Kargi and North Horr sites, by contrast, are the most pastoralist of the Kenya sample, as 
reflected in a general absence of alternative livelihood options and larger average household herd 
sizes, measured in tropical livestock units (TLU)2.   Pastoralist households with larger herds 
participate more actively in livestock markets.  Table 4 reinforces this rather intuitive result by 
showing that the more active participants in livestock markets have higher average livestock 
                                                          
2 1 TLU = 1 cattle = 0.7 camels = 10 goats = 11 sheep.  We also classify cattle and camels as “large stock” and goats 
and sheep as “small stock”.  
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holdings.  Autarkic households own an average of 10.8 TLUs, as opposed to the households most 
active in markets, which average holdings of over 40 TLUs.   
 
 
Figure 2: Average Income Reported Over a Three-Month Period  
     (Source: McPeak and Little, forthcoming.  Note: $1≈Kshs 75) 
 
 
Table 3: Average Site TLU and Herd Composition 
 
The patterns in southern Ethiopia are, on their surface, opposite to those in northern Kenya.  The 
sites with the best market access (Finchawa, Wachille and Dida Hara) are also those with the 
highest rates of household livestock market participation, far higher than those for the site with 
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the largest average herd sizes (Dillo).3  However, in southern Ethiopia, market access does not 
present the same non-pastoral livelihood diversification options that it does in northern Kenya 
(Little et al. 2001), so in greater Ethiopia, market access means reduced costs to market 
participation, which necessarily stimulates livestock marketing at the margin.   
 
Pooling the data from Ethiopia and Kenya and across all survey periods, advanced econometric 
analysis4 corroborates the Kenya patterns with respect to herd size.  There exists a strong, 
statistically significant, positive causal association between a household’s herd size and its 
livestock sales volume, controlling for other household-level covariates as well as location- and 
period-specific effects (Bellemare and Barrett 2004).   
   
Table 4: Frequency of Market Participation and Average TLU 
 
 
The key practical implication of these descriptive statistics and richer multivariate regression 
analysis is that active livestock markets depend on pastoralists attaining and maintaining 
sufficiently large herd sizes, allowing a comfortable margin for liquidating animals through the 
market.  However, the development of physical infrastructure such as roads and modern 
communications supports not only livestock marketing but also the emergence of alternative 
livelihoods.  It seems likely that the directly stimulative effects on livestock marketing would be 
trumped, in time if not immediately, by the negative effects on livestock marketing that result 
naturally from reducing household dependence on herding. 
 
 
B. Cash Needs and Bank Access 
 
                                                          
3 Severe insecurity in Qorate significantly disrupted livestock marketing there during the survey period, confounding 
comparisons between this survey site and others. 
4 The technique used here estimated a two-stage model of household behavior. In the first stage, the model studied 
what determines whether a household will be a net buyer, autarkic, or a net seller on the livestock market. The 
second stage then studied what determines how much a household will buy or sell respectively for net buyer and net 
seller households. This estimation technique and the results can be found in Bellemare and Barrett (2004). 
QUARTERS 
REPORTING 
LIVESTOCK 
MARKETING 
ACTIVITY 
% OF 
RESPONDENTS, 
KENYA 
% OF 
RESPONDENTS, 
ETHIOPIA 
MEAN TLU OF 
MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS
0 9% 13%           10.78  
1 19% 19%           15.59  
2 23% 21%           14.47  
3 16% 19%           19.58  
4 12% 16%           19.70  
5 6% 5%           35.72  
6 9% 4%           30.28  
7 4% 3%           45.86  
8 1% 1%           48.30  
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Northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia are net exporter regions of animals, as one would expect 
given the comparative advantage in livestock production enjoyed by arid and semi-arid lands.  
The micro-level data reflect this.  Households tend to sell livestock with greater frequency and in 
larger quantities than they buy animals.  Over the course of the study period, 89% of the 918 
quarterly observations of household market participation were net sales.  Considering net market 
transactions across the two-year survey period, 80% of households participated as net sellers, 
while only 8% of households purchased more TLUs than they sold.  11% of households 
exhibited zero net sales, almost entirely due to non-participation in livestock markets during 
those two years.5  
 
Nonetheless, gross and net sales volumes are low.  In no quarter was the average household 
transaction more than 1 TLU for non-autarkic households (Table 5).  The limited transactions 
volumes temper the immediate gains pastoralist households can reap from generalized stimulus 
to regional and international livestock markets.  Any hypothesized price gains from, for example, 
trade promotion, will have only a small positive welfare effect on the region given the very 
modest household-level net sales volumes. 
 
Table 5: Average Quarterly Net TLU of Livestock Market Participants 
 
While pastoralists actively use the markets to offload animals, albeit in small quantities, 
restocking is typically relegated to births rather than purchases.  We compare purchases as a 
percentage of gross herd recruitment (purchases plus births) by species across periods in Table 6.  
Purchases comprise a relatively small share of herd growth.  Note in particular the correlation 
coefficient between births and purchases as calculated in the final row in Table 6.  There exists a 
strong negative correlation between births and purchases for the dryland species, camels and 
smallstock, as opposed to a very slight positive relationship between cattle births and purchases.  
In the drier areas, pastoralists appear to use the markets to restock their animals in times when 
                                                          
5 Most of the non-participating households were stockless pastoralists, i.e., households that belong culturally and 
geographically to pastoralist communities but who no longer hold any livestock.  These are typically among the 
poorest members of the community. 
    Jun-00 Sep-00 Dec-00 Mar-02 Jun-02 Sep-02 Dec-02 Mar-03 Jun-03
KENYA average net tlu -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 
  
% of HHs 
participating in 
livestock market 56.35% 42.54% 35.29% 30.94% 32.60% 30.94% 28.11% 23.76% 11.05%
ETHIOPIA average net tlu -0.9 -1.1 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.8 -0.9 -0.1 -0.9 
  
% of HHs 
participating in 
livestock market 40.40% 35.76% 27.33% 30.46% 25.83% 19.21% 34.46% 21.85% 26.00%
TOTALaverage net tlu -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -0.6 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7 
  
% of HHs 
participating in 
livestock market 49.10% 39.46% 31.56% 30.72% 29.52% 25.60% 30.93% 22.89% 17.82%
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the birth rate is not high enough to restock herds to a viable level.  Partly this reflects species 
differences.  As cattle are more fragile, both reproduction and purchases increase as cattle 
mortality falls and the carrying capacity of the natural resource base recovers.  Since camels and 
smallstock are much more resilient than cattle, pastoralists can use purchases and births as 
substitute methods of herd restocking.   
 
 
Table 6: Births and Purchases in TLUs Across Species, by Quarter 
 
  
Camel 
Births, 
TLU 
Camel 
Purchases, 
TLU 
Purchases 
as a % of 
gross herd 
recruitment 
Cattle  
Births, 
TLU 
Cattle  
Purchases, 
TLU 
Purchases 
as a % of 
gross herd 
recruitment 
Smallstock 
Births, 
TLU 
Smallstock 
Purchases, 
TLU 
Purchases 
as a % of 
gross herd 
recruitment
Jun-00 117.3 0.0 0.00% 168.0 49.0 22.58% 67.8 5.0 6.87% 
Sep-00 24.3 1.4 5.56% 99.0 11.0 10.00% 31.0 2.9 8.55% 
Dec-00 80.1 7.2 8.20% 113.0 7.0 5.83% 51.7 2.3 4.26% 
Mar-01 70.1 2.9 3.92% 105.0 12.0 10.26% 122.0 2.2 1.77% 
Jun-01 62.9 1.4 2.22% 211.0 2.0 0.94% 153.4 1.6 1.03% 
Sep-01 38.6 4.3 10.00% 212.0 4.0 1.85% 94.9 2.0 2.06% 
Dec-01 123.0 2.9 2.27% 321.0 11.0 3.31% 119.7 4.1 3.31% 
Mar-02 113.0 1.4 1.25% 343.0 24.0 6.54% 117.9 2.8 2.32% 
Jun-02 127.3 0.0 0.00% 213.0 1.0 0.47% 91.7 0.9 0.97% 
                    
Coefficient of Correlation 
between Births and Purchases -0.3284     0.0579     -0.2395
  
 
One can likewise look at the relative importance of markets as regulators of pastoralist herd sizes 
by studying the ratio of purchases to births for restocking and by looking at the ratio of sales to 
deaths.  A higher ratio indicates greater reliance on markets.  We computed these ratios as well 
(not reported) and found that the ratio increases as market access improves, but in no case did 
that ratio approach one.  Even in the most market-oriented sites in northern Kenya and southern 
Ethiopia, biological factors remain the dominant regulator of pastoralist herd size.  
 
All of this raises a fundamental question: if pastoralists enjoy comparative advantage in livestock 
production and are net exporters of animals, why do they not sell more animals?  One possible 
explanation is that pastoralists sell their animals largely to meet their immediate needs for cash 
(e.g., for purchasing food or medicine, for paying school fees, etc.).  Under this hypothesis, 
livestock serve as a “bank on hooves” as well as a productive asset.  In this region of northern 
Kenya, a household of average size needs approximately 500 Kshs (roughly US$7) per month to 
provide a regular supply of consumption goods, such as maize, tea, and sugar, in addition to 
lumpy, seasonal needs such as school fees.  Relatively wealthy pastoralists, with greater herd 
size, have considerably higher expenditure rates (Barrett and McPeak, forthcoming).  Thus one 
hypothesis consistent with the data is that wealthier households use livestock markets more 
frequently to cash out animals because they have greater cash needs.  When livestock prices are 
rising in the post-drought period, the wealthier households are able to sell surplus animals and 
take advantage of favorable prices, while poorer households tend to hold on to their few animals 
remaining after the drought, unless forced to sell by consumption needs.  However, econometric 
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analysis shows that controlling for period- and location-specific effects, household livestock 
sales volumes fall as prices increase, consistent with the notion that cash-limited households sell 
animals to meet immediate expenditure needs, rather than to capture capital gains on an 
appreciated asset.  This hypothesis of cash-constrained livestock marketing behavior is also 
consistent with the econometric evidence that, by contrast, households are highly price 
responsive in purchasing animals.  If the price falls sharply, they begin buying, and if prices rise 
they stop.6 
 
Why would households hold livestock in the face of rising livestock prices?  The simple answer 
is that livestock offer the best rate of return of assets available to pastoralists in this region 
(McPeak forthcoming).  Livestock prices increase with improvement in underlying forage and 
water availability, reflecting greater animal productivity (Barrett et al. 2003).  Because livestock 
are a productive asset that generates future income, not just a storable commodity like grain, the 
incentives to sell or buy animals in response to shocks (e.g., drought) and to price fluctuations 
are more complex and tend to militate against sales (McPeak 2004).  Indeed, because livestock 
offer the highest returns, households rationally accumulate herds over time (Bellemare and 
Barrett 2004, Lybbert et al. 2004, McPeak forthcoming).  If herd accumulation is rational, then 
livestock marketing will respond mainly to demands for cash needs rather than to short-term 
profit-taking opportunities. 
 
Table 7: Bank Account Holders and Average TLUs across Sites 
 
  RESPONDENTS 
BANK 
ACCOUNT 
HOLDERS 
AVERAGE 
SITE TLU 
AVG 
BANK 
HOLDERS 
TLU 
Dirib Gombo 31 2 13.3 22.2 
Kargi 32 2 30.6 14.8 
Logo Logo 30 5 21.3 22.6 
Ngambo 31 2 6.6 9.2 
North Horr 31 15 25.6 25.6 
Suguta Marmar 30 1 13.3 36.0 
       
Dida Hara 31 1 15.5 124.9 
Dillo 30 0 45.1 n/o 
Finchawa 31 1 14.7 4.0 
Qorate 30 0 13.2 n/o 
Wachille 30 0 15.3 n/o 
Total 337 29 19.5 26.0 
 
The idea that pastoralists will cash out animals in response to higher prices depends 
fundamentally on the assumption that there exists an alternative means by which to store wealth.  
This has induced some observers to posit that the introduction of financial institutions (e.g., 
banks or micro-finance institutions) might allow pastoralists to diversify their risk, holding assets 
in a different and perhaps safer form (Coppock 1994, Desta 1999). As shown in Table 7, few 
                                                          
6 Bellemare and Barrett (2004) estimate the price elasticities of demand and supply at the means in these data as  
-2.73 and -0.10, respectively. 
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pastoralists (8.6%) in our sample held a bank account between March 2000 and June 2002.  This 
makes it difficult to formally test the hypothesis that increased bank-mediated savings could 
affect livestock marketing patterns, as there is relatively little variation in our data.7  By trying to 
understand why so few pastoralists hold bank accounts we can perhaps uncover useful 
information revealing the role financial institutions might play with respect to pastoralist 
livestock marketing behavior. 
 
Among the study sites, bank accounts were observed most frequently in North Horr, where a 
Nairobi-based NGO, KREP Development Agency (KDA), opened a Financial Service 
Association (FSA) which makes accessible bank accounts to locals purchasing shares in the 
financial cooperative.  Though nearly half of the respondents in the North Horr site had bank 
accounts at some point between June 2000 and June 2002, membership in the FSA declined 
among the sample population between these periods.  Only one household in our sample 
maintained an FSA account over the entire two-year survey period.   
 
If banks indeed assist pastoralists in risk management, it is natural to ask why FSA membership 
among North Horr respondents declines over time and why so few pastoralists hold bank 
accounts elsewhere.  Osterloh (2004) found that the value of North Horr FSA shares declined in 
value by 50% from 1997 to 2000, due to an extraordinarily high rate of loan default.  Far from 
providing a secure repository of cash investments in shares, investments in FSA shares proved a 
money-losing proposition.  McPeak (forthcoming) similarly finds that livestock raising offers a 
higher average rate of return than savings in the commercial bank.  Comparing the rates of return 
in TLUs of herds from two Gabra study areas in northern Kenya, he finds herds returned an 
average annual rate of 6% and 15% from early 1993 to early 1997.  By contrast, once one 
accounts for the fees charged on bank savings, a cash deposit the equivalent of roughly 25 goats’ 
value or more returns approximately 2% per-year over a four-year period, while a deposit of 
between 18 and 25 goats renders a rate of return of  -44 %, and accounts worth less than 18 goats 
were completely dissipated by service charges in four years’ time.  The positive rate of return 
threshold herd of 25 goats is roughly 10% of average household herd size, or the equivalent of 
greater than half of the average household’s total livestock sales over the four year study period.  
Even including the losses of late 1996, and excluding the benefits of income generation as well 
as the costs associated with accessing savings in the district capital, livestock offer a higher 
average rate of return than savings.  While it could be argued that formal banking may still be 
attractive in terms of reduced variance in return (Desta 1999), discussions with herders suggest 
that herders do not consider bank savings a low risk asset.  They express doubts about the safety 
of money placed in banks. This could reflect the weakness of institutions in Kenya, e.g., the lack 
of checks and balances on the banking system or the lack of deposit insurance, or simply a bias 
towards what herders already know in the face of what they have no experience with, i.e., a 
status quo bias in favor of livestock and against a banking system that is perceived as complex. 
 
Empirical evidence does not support the claim that lack of banking options significantly limits 
livestock marketing.  Few pastoralists wish to cash in livestock to hold financial assets they 
consider risky and that generate significantly lower real rates of return than livestock.  This may 
                                                          
7 Background econometric estimates generated in the preparation of Bellemare and Barrett (2004) consistently found 
no statistically or economically significant relationship between holding a bank account and either participating in 
market or the sales or purchase volume conditional on market participation. 
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change as non-pastoral livelihood options become viable and remunerative in the region.  But 
that change will signal a decline in the importance of livestock and, as discussed in the previous 
sub-section, would seem to be associated with less, not more, livestock marketing. 
 
 
C. Marketing Costs and Risks  
 
Due to the poor state of transport and marketing infrastructure in the study region, many 
observers cite the perceived high costs of moving animals to market and of traders evacuating 
animals from up-country source markets to terminal markets (e.g., Addis Ababa, Nairobi) as 
pervasive problems crippling the livestock marketing chain (Bailey et al. 2000, Mahmoud 2003).  
Yet there has been little-to-no empirical evidence on the actual marketing costs faced by 
pastoralists.  Our surveys included a module fielded in May-June 2002 that collected data on the 
cash expenses incurred while buying or selling animals during the respondent’s most recent trip 
to market.  We emphasize that we can only discuss cash expenditures, which clearly 
underestimate total economic costs that include the pastoralists’ time, risk, etc.  But given the 
low opportunity costs of time for people earning less than $0.25/person per day, on average, the 
monetary value of time spent marketing is low.  Furthermore, since pastoralists often combine 
livestock sales or purchases at market with other transactions they need to execute in town, -- 
e.g., purchase of animal or human medicines, picking up food aid rations, visiting government 
offices -- full attribution of the cash costs of going to town to market livestock overstates the true 
marginal costs of buying or selling animals.  On balance, cash expenditures are not only the best 
available data on household-level marketing costs, they are likely not far off the true economic 
cost since the downward bias associated with the omission of modest non-monetary marketing 
costs is likely offset by the sharing of the observed cash costs across multiple household 
activities at market.  
 
Marketing costs can be divided between variable and fixed costs.  Variable costs increase with 
each animal marketed, while fixed costs are incurred regardless of the quantity of animals sold 
and affect only the discrete decision to participate or not in the market.  High fixed costs create 
increasing returns to scale in livestock marketing, discouraging small volume sales.  High 
variable costs, by contrast, are scale invariant in their effects, serving just to reduce net proceeds 
from sales.  Variable costs such as animal transport, council fees, and animal health certification, 
are generally species- and market-specific.  In principle, these fees constitute an unavoidable cost 
of selling livestock at market.  However, some markets in our sample, such as Kargi, Suguta 
Marmar, Finchawa, and Wachille, are clearly more systematic than others in collecting these 
fees.  Estimated fixed costs include transporting the participant, food, lodging, bribes, and fixed 
brokerage fees (not commissions), and vary from pastoralist to pastoralist.  As Table 8 illustrates, 
67% of sampled Kenyan market participants and 79% of those in Ethiopia incurred some sort of 
cash costs in their last livestock transaction, though the percentage of those incurring fees varies 
greatly by site.  In sites close to large markets, such as Ng’ambo and Dillo, few respondents 
reported incurring fixed marketing costs, as both sites are close to major markets rendering 
transportation, food, and lodging costs avoidable through a brief trek to market and walk home 
the same day.  The need for veterinary medicines can also be met easily in these sites as the need 
arises.  In more remote and pastoral sites, such as Kargi, trekking to town constitutes a non-
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negligible investment of time, and needs such as medicines might be deferred until a trip to town 
to market livestock. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Percentage of Participants Incurring Marketing Fees 
 
  
Res ponden ts 
M arketing  
Lives tock 
To tal 
Res ponden ts  
%  o f 
M arket 
Partic ipan ts  
Incurring  
M arketing  
Fees  
Dirib  Go mbo  18 22 77%  
Karg i 20 20 100%  
Logo  Logo  21 18 83%  
Nga mbo  12 16 6%  
North  Horr 20 20 40%  
Sugu ta M armar 11 11 100%  
To tal Kenya 102 107 67%  
      
Dida Hara 16 17 94%  
Dillo  14 16 25%  
Finchawa 18 9 100%  
W ach ille 20 20 100%  
To tal Eth iop ia 68 62 79%  
 
As evinced in Table 9, few of our sample pastoralist households paid to transport animals.  In 
Ethiopia, only one pastoralist in Wachille paid to trek a herd of cattle to market.  No other 
Ethiopian households incurred any cash transport costs in marketing, although they certainly 
spend time taking animals to and from market.  In Kenya, more pastoralists paid to trek or truck 
their animals to market, though frequency varies with site.  In Dirib Gumbo and Ng’ambo, sites 
close to market, no pastoralists paid to transport their animals to market.  In more remote 
locations such as Kargi and North Horr, 26% and 34% of smallstock sold or bought incurred 
transportation expenses.  Kargi was the only Kenyan site where pastoralists hired labor to trek 
their animals. 
 
The trekking or trucking of animals is not the sole transportation cost borne by pastoralists marketing 
their livestock.  The average costs of human transportation actually exceed those of transporting the 
marketed animals.  The sum of animal and human transport costs comprises the largest component of 
marketing costs in both Ethiopia and Kenya, 44% and 60%, respectively.  Improving upon the 
notoriously poor infrastructure would reduce the high costs of transportation in the region by increasing 
security, traffic, market access, and speed of travel.   
 
Perhaps more striking, and counter to the conventional wisdom among donors and policymakers, 
is the fact that pastoralist households’ cash expenses in livestock marketing appear relatively 
low.  As reflected in the two rightmost columns of Table 9, variable costs average less than six 
Table 9: Marketing Costs Incurred, by Cost Category and Site 
 
  
LIVESTOCK 
TYPE 
LIVESTOCK 
MARKETED 
PER 
TRANSACTION 
% PAID TO 
TRANSPORT 
ANIMALS 
AVG COST 
TO 
TRANSPORT 
ANIMAL/HEAD 
(Kshs)  
% 
INCURRING 
COUNCIL 
FEES 
AVG 
COUNCIL 
FEE/HEAD 
(Kshs) 
TOTAL 
AVG 
VARIABLE 
COSTS 
PER 
ANIMAL 
(Kshs)  
TOTAL 
AVG 
FIXED 
COSTS 
PER 
MARKET 
VISIT 
(Kshs) 
VARIABLE 
COSTS 
AS AN 
AVG % 
OF TOTAL 
REVENUE 
FIXED 
COSTS 
AS AN 
AVG % 
OF 
TOTAL 
REVENUE 
Smallstock 1.79 0.0% n/o 72.0% 26 26 Dirib 
Gumbo Largestock 1.38 0.0% n/o 72.7% 50 50 0 1.0% 0.0% 
Kargi Smallstock 3.41 75.0% 43.2 100.0% 44 87 
  Largestock 1.33 15.0% 300 25.0% 100 400 54 2.9% 11.1% 
Logo 
Logo Smallstock 1.25 14.3% 50 86.7% 39 89 
  Largestock 1.83 14.3% 150 90.9% 100 250 41 3.4% 17.6% 
Ng’ambo Smallstock 3.27 0.0% n/o 5.6% 50 50 
  Largestock 1.80 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 50 0.2% 0.5% 
North 
Horr Smallstock 2.16 70.0% 61.7 43.9% 20 82 
  Largestock 1.00 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 440 5.4% 0.7% 
Smallstock 1.20 36.4% 42.5 100.0% 36 78 Suguta 
Marmar Largestock 1.00 9.1% 250 100.0% 50 300 24 5.9% 5.1% 
                
Dida 
Hara Smallstock 1.75 0.0% n/o 85.7% 30 30 
  Largestock 1.67 0.0% n/o 100.0% 120 120 16 1.6% 7.4% 
Dillo Smallstock 1.09 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 
  Largestock 1.40 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 96 0.0% 1.8% 
Finchawa Smallstock 2.13 0.0% n/o 64.7% 40 40 
  Largestock 1.91 0.0% n/o 100.0% 139 139 19 0.6% 8.9% 
Wachille Smallstock 1.50 0.0% n/o 100.0% 40 40 
  Largestock 1.22 5.0% 100 100.0% 137 237 16 0.5% 7.5% 
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percent of total livestock sales revenues in each site, and less than two percent in each of the 
Ethiopia sites.  Fixed costs are uniformly larger than variable costs in Ethiopia, but still 
reasonably modest, at less than nine percent of total livestock sales revenues.  In Kenya, there 
exists considerable spatial variation in fixed costs, with Kargi and Logologo – the only two sites 
in our sample not within just a few kilometers of a regular livestock market – exhibiting the 
highest fixed costs of market participation.  The relatively modest levels of fixed costs are 
likewise reflected in the small average transaction size – less than two large stock or four small 
stock per transaction in each site – and the absence of any strong correlation between average 
fixed costs and mean livestock marketed per transaction.  Just greater than half (50.5%) of 
marketed transactions are for one animal only.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of transactions 
volumes, underscoring the small lots traded, no matter the species involved.  
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Figure 3: Frequency of Marketing Quantities of Camel, Cattle, and Small Stock 
 
As a percentage of gross sales revenues, marketing costs are relatively greater for small stock 
than large stock, as illustrated by figures 4a and 4b.  Nonetheless, small stock marketed 
outnumber large stock marketed by a factor of three to one.  Of the 3,041 animals purchased or 
sold in these data, 2,280 were either goats or sheep.  In more remote, drier sites, this factor 
increases for the simple reason that cattle fare less well in drier agroecologies, so goats become 
more plentiful in more arid zones.  In North Horr, for example, only 5 large stock were 
marketed, as opposed to 297 small stock.  The low volume of individual transactions and the 
relative dependence on smallstock sales rather than cattle or camels is consistent with the 
hypothesis that pastoralist livestock sales are driven largely by immediate cash needs, rather than 
by profit-seeking liquidation of animals.   
 
The cost of marketing animals relative to the price the animals received on the market varies 
from site to site.  For small stock, marketing costs ranged from two percent in areas close to town 
like Dirib Gumbo, to 25% in more remote areas like Kargi.  Less variation was observed with in 
the costs of marketing large stock.  No cash expenses were incurred in either North Horr or 
Ng’ambo, (recall that only five largestock were marketed in North Horr, and Ng’ambo has a 
major livestock market in the nearby town of Marigat), with a maximum of 10% of large stock 
price in Wachille.   
 
Although livestock marketing costs are relatively modest, econometric estimates reported in 
Bellemare and Barrett (2004) indicate that they do statistically significantly affect household 
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marketing behavior, discouraging market participation in general and, conditional on 
participating in the market, dampening sales volumes (in the case of variable costs) and purchase 
volumes (in the case of fixed costs).  Pastoralists largely behave in economically rational ways, 
but the magnitude of the marketing costs involved means that these really are not a significant 
impediment to household-level livestock sales or purchases.8   
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FIGURE 4 a,b: Marketing Costs as a Percentage of Average Price 
 
One prospectively important cost we cannot quantify is the risk associated with taking one’s 
livestock to market.  Livestock raiding, both between ethnic groups and between clans within an 
ethnic group, has a rich and long history in the study area.  Oral histories refer to years of 
                                                          
8 Marketing costs – especially for transportation – do seem to figure prominently however in trader behavior and in 
the spatial correlation of livestock prices (Barrett et al. 2003, Mahmoud 2003, Barrett and Luseno 2004).   
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particularly devastating (or alternately, rewarding) raids in reference to the raids themselves.   
The influx of automatic weapons has altered the scope of the danger associated with raids and 
potentially the commercialization of raided animals (Fleisher, 2000).  When we include in our 
econometric models simple dummy variables for periods in which survey communities reported 
raids, we find no statistically significant effect on livestock marketing patterns.  This only tells us 
that the experience of raids has no impact on livestock marketing behavior, and does not signal 
that the nearly ever-present risk of raiding has no effect. Given that insecurity typically prompt 
pastoralists to relocate from relatively remote and dangerous areas to more populous areas closer 
to market, insecurity may actually increase livestock market participation rather than discourage 
it at household level, ignoring the prospective effects of insecurity on livestock prices.  Insecurity 
is also more likely to force pastoralists into the market to purchase animals to replace those lost 
to raiding. 
 
On balance, the empirical evidence suggests that while marketing costs and risks are real, they 
do not pose a major obstacle to livestock marketing among pastoralists in the sites we study.  
There are good reasons to work hard to reduce insecurity and violence in the region and to 
improve infrastructure.  But policymakers and operational agencies in the field should not 
undertake such efforts in order to stimulate livestock marketing. 
 
D. Informational Constraints  
 
One sometimes hears conjectures that if pastoralists had better forecast information about 
upcoming rainfall and forage conditions, then they could better use livestock markets to offload 
animals in anticipation of temporarily reduced rangeland carrying capacity or purchase animals 
when forage and water availability are expected to be especially good.  Similarly, one frequently 
hears complaints about the poor state of livestock market price reporting systems and the 
disadvantage this creates for herders wishing to transact on the market.  These related claims 
imply that information gaps limit livestock marketing by pastoralists.  This hypothesis is testable. 
 
Considerable resources have been directed toward building up climate forecasting and 
dissemination capacity in the region, with the Drought Monitoring Centre (DMC) in Nairobi the 
nexus of such efforts (Curry 2001).  Highly advanced early warning systems are being developed 
predicated upon the assumption that climate forecasts will assist pastoralists in risk mitigation.  
Using innovative methods to elicit pastoralists’ expectations of and response to rainfall, Luseno 
et al. (2003) and Lybbert et al. (2003) found that although  a mere 20% of households in our 
survey area received modern climate forecasts issued by DMC, confidence in indigenous climate 
forecasts outweighed confidence in modern forecasts by a three to one factor, and despite the 
high degree of confidence in traditional forecasts, few respondents changed their herd 
management or livestock marketing behavior in response to their expectations of upcoming 
climate conditions.  There does not seem to exist much of an information gap, certainly not one 
significant enough for modern climate forecast information to have any economic value for 
pastoralists.  The empirical evidence therefore suggests that climate information is not a 
particularly limiting factor to pastoralists’ livestock marketing behavior.   
 
Nor does there not seem to be a scarcity of information about livestock prices among these  
households.  Respondents to the May-June 2002 household livestock marketing survey module 
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  KENYA ETHIOPIA
Daily 24.32% 6.03% 
Every Few Days 20.27% 10.34% 
Weekly 16.22% 37.07% 
Every Few Weeks 19.59% 15.52% 
Monthly 8.78% 10.34% 
Every Few Months 4.05% 11.21% 
Rarely 2.70% 9.48% 
Never 4.05% 0.00% 
Traders 56.44% 
Friends 45.45% 
Relatives 38.64% 
Brokers 34.47% 
Others who go to market 13.64% 
Sellers 12.88% 
Producers 11.74% 
Travelers 10.61% 
Go to market 7.20% 
Neighbors 5.30% 
Other 9.47% 
were asked to cite up to four market price information sources they use and the frequency with 
which they update their information on livestock prices.  On average, respondents received 
information from two sources, 1.9 sources in Kenya and 2.1 in Ethiopia.  Respondents gathered 
information about livestock prices primarily through traders, although friends, relatives and 
livestock brokers are likewise used frequently (Table 10).   Interestingly enough, less than 13 
percent of respondents inquired after sellers of livestock about prices, perhaps reflecting the 
sensitive nature of livestock and money.  Moreover, few households go to market themselves in 
order to observe transactions and collect price information first-hand.  Rather, information 
networks suffice to generate and distribute adequately reliable and timely information about 
market conditions.   
 
  Table 11: Frequency with which  
Table 10: Sources of Price Information   Respondents Check Primary Price 
Information Source 
      
 
People collect market price information frequently.  More than half the survey households 
checked on market prices at least weekly (Table 11).  In Kenya, 45 percent of respondents 
checked on market prices at least every few days.  Given the range of price information sources 
used and the high frequency with which they are consulted, one wonders precisely what sort of 
price information is missing from the local market.  The empirical evidence available through 
our surveys suggests that neither climate nor price information limit pastoralists’ livestock 
marketing to any significant degree, certainly not enough to justify significant new expenditures 
in support of additional market price information generation and dissemination activities. 
 
E. Herd Management Practices 
 
The final set of oft-hypothesized constraints on livestock marketing relate to pastoralists’ 
traditional herd management practices, perhaps especially their tendency to maintain herds that 
are heavily female and customary livestock loan and gift practices9 that bestow incomplete 
                                                          
9 While the exact arrangements of gifts and loans vary subtly across ethnic groups and clans and over time, the most 
common arrangements give the borrower rights to the milk and any offspring born to the borrowed animal(s), while 
the lender retains ownership claims over the loaned animal(s). 
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property rights on those who receive animals.  Borrowed animals or those temporarily herded for 
others typically cannot be sold or slaughtered.  Insofar as such practices are widespread, one 
would logically expect these herd management practices to limit livestock marketing.   
 
Kerven (1992, p. 109) asserts that livestock trade historically “provided [pastoralists] a vital 
means of restructuring or rebuilding herds or flocks, through conversion of one livestock species 
for another and by exchanging male for female animals.”  But as we have already demonstrated, 
pastoralists use the markets almost exclusively for sales.  If pastoralists rarely use markets for 
restocking or restructuring herds – most likely due to limited cash liquidity – then herd structure 
may impede marketing in so far as herders try to hold onto fertile females and quality bulls for 
breeding.  Since herd growth is critical to pastoralist welfare (Lybbert et al. 2004, McPeak 2004), 
and because herd growth comes overwhelmingly through biological reproduction (Table 6), one 
might hypothesize that pastoralists are less likely to sell, for any given herd size, when a greater 
proportion of their livestock are female.   
 
The data fail to support either hypothesis, that herd composition in terms of either incomplete 
property rights or gender mix impedes livestock marketing.  The primary reason why property 
rights have little impact on livestock marketing is that relatively few animals are encumbered by 
incomplete or complex property rights.  Of the 330 participants in the household survey, only 
25% had any animals burdened with complex property rights at the time of the baseline survey in 
March 2000, and of those 86 households, encumbered animals comprised only 19% of their herd, 
on average.  Less than five percent of the aggregate herd in our study area was affected by the 
complex property rights governing many livestock exchanged through traditional loan and gift 
arrangements.   
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Figure 5: Households with Encumbered Animals,        Figure 6: Percentage of Total Herd Encumbered, 
     by Household TLU Holdings           by Household TLU Holdings 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that the likelihood that a household herds any animals borrowed 
from or herded on behalf of others is increasing in initial herd size.  Yet, as Figure 6 shows,  
animals with encumbered property rights constitute a smaller share of these larger herds.  
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Moreover, nearly all such animals are females – typically lactating cows – the animals least 
likely to be sold under any case as households depend upon fertile cows for milk and for 
(re)building herds. While 68% of the TLU in our sample were female, greater than two-thirds of 
marketed animals in this region are male (Barrett et al., 2003).     
 
Multivariate econometric analysis corroborates the impression that traditional herd management 
practices that place a heavy emphasis on females within the herd and on gift and loan institutions 
to protect herd sizes and to ensure household food security do not appear to limit pastoralists’ 
livestock marketing.  Neither the female share of a household’s herd nor the share of the herd 
subject to complex property rights have a statistically or economically significant effect on either 
the likelihood of market participation nor on marketed volumes conditional on participation 
(Bellemare and Barrett 2004).  
 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Pastoralists in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia participate actively in livestock markets.  
However, the small average transaction volume limits the possibility of any significant near term 
impact due to stimulus of broader regional and international marketing opportunities.  Market 
transactions are almost exclusively sales, primarily of goats and sheep, despite the fact that 
marketing costs, although modest, are highest for these species.  Overall, livestock marketing 
costs are surprisingly inconsequential at the household level and information about either climate 
or market conditions does not appear to significantly limit household livestock market 
participation.  Nor do traditional herd management practices appear to impede livestock 
marketing by pastoralist households.  Pastoralists do, however, respond to livestock prices, quite 
robustly to the prices they pay when buying animals.  But the household-level livestock supply 
curve appears to be modestly backward-bending, i.e., sales volumes respond negatively, on 
average, to increased prices rather than positively.   
 
All of this evidence supports the hypothesis that households sell livestock primarily to meet 
immediate expenditure needs and they otherwise accumulate livestock as the most remunerative 
asset to hold in the rangelands of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya.  This is consistent with 
the observation of strong life cycle effects, wherein households tend to buy animals when they 
are younger – to help build their herd – and to sell animals when they are older, and that 
livestock sales increase significantly with a household’s herd size, reflecting greater household 
expenditure requirements.  In sum, we find scant empirical support for many of the claims 
commonly made in current discussions of how best to stimulate livestock marketing off-take 
among pastoralists in this region.  The best strategy for stimulating livestock marketing – which 
is unlikely to become robust any time soon regardless of policy interventions – appears to be 
generalized support for viable pastoralism. 
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